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Outreach and Profitability Trade-off: 
Does Synergy between Islamic Banking and Islamic 
Microfinance Institutions Matter?
Ruri Eka Fauziah Nasution* and Habib Ahmed
Durham University
The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of linkage program between Islamic 
Banking (IB) and Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil (BMT) on BMT financing growth and profitability. This 
study also aims to compare three linkage models and to explore the keys factors that affect the imple-
mentation of linkage program. To achieve these objectives, both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods are employed. The dataset consists of the financial statement of 26 BMT in Indonesia and 
interviews with 12 managers of BMT and IB in Jakarta. The findings suggest that a synergy between 
IB and BMT through linkage program has significant impact on BMT financing growth and BMT 
ROE. Among three linkage models, executing model appears to be the most preferable model, both by 
BMT and IB. The finding also suggests that internal and external factors at BMT level have impacts 
on the effectiveness of linkage program.
Keywords: Baitul Mal Wat Tamwil, Islamic Microfinance, Islamic Banking, Linkage program, Level 
of Outreach, Profitability
Introduction
As a country with largest Muslim population 
worldwide, Islamic Microfinance Institutions 
(IMFI) in Indonesia have an important role to 
support poverty alleviation program. Baitul Mal 
Wat Tamwil (BMT) is the main player of IMFI 
in Indonesia. BMT has grown significantly, 
both in terms of number and total assets. There 
are approximately 7500 BMTs in Indonesia in 
2013 (Jamaludin, 2013) with total assets  more 
than IDR 6 trillionin 2011 (Oktarianisa, 2011). 
However, since there is high demand of financ-
ing, it is difficult for BMT to meet this demand 
from their deposits fund. In this regards, like 
other Microfinance Institutions (MFI), BMTs 
also face challenges in their sustainability to 
provide financing for the poor and SME seg-
ments.
Islamic Banking (IB), on the other hand, has 
large amount of fund. As part of Islamic finan-
cial system, IB has a social obligation to pro-
vide financing for Micro, Small, and Medium 
Enterprise (MSME). However, IB finds barriers 
to provide financing to MSME. These barriers 
include the problems of asymmetric informa-
tion, physical barriers of poor infrastructure, so-
cioeconomic factors, lack of collateral and high 
transaction cost (Ahmed, 2004). These barriers 
also make it difficult for IB to provide financing 
for the poorest segment of the population.
Conceptually, both IB and IMFI are intended 
to contribute on social justice (Obaidullah & 
Khan, 2008). IB and IMFI may compelement 
one another in both ideological and practical 
terms (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1999). Both IB 
and BMT are intended to contribute on social 
justice. Each institution has its own strength 
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and weakness in achieving this noble objec-
tive. A synergy between IB and BMT through 
linkage programs expected to result in mutual 
benefits. Linkage program is an attempt to pro-
mote synergy between IB and IMFI initiated by 
Bank Indonesia and The Ministry of Coopera-
tives & SME which allows BMT to serve as an 
intermediary between IB and customer, particu-
larly to deliver the equity financing for MSME. 
There is a need to focus on the benefits of link-
age program, particularly on BMT side, which 
can be measured by the level of outreach and 
sustainability. In addition, this paper attempts 
to identify most preferable linkage models and 
investigate the key factors that affect the imple-
mentation of linkage program.
Literature Review
IMFIs in Indonesia dominated by Baitul 
Mal Wat Tamwil (BMT). BMT is classified as 
Islamic cooperatives and under the supervi-
sion of The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME. 
According to Hadisumarto & Ismail (2010), 
BMT has dual function; as a Baitut Tamwil and 
Baitul Mal. The business function of BMT is 
by serving as a financial intermediation. Most 
BMTs in Indonesia are deposits-taken institu-
tions, which serve as informal banks. The social 
missions of BMT are serving as amil (collect 
and distribute zakah), collecting and distribut-
ing infaq and shadaqah, and providing money 
on qard al-hassan financing.  Zakat, waqf, and 
shadaqah are the main instruments in Islamic 
scheme in poverty alleviation. These funds 
have lower risk than debt in capital and are ex-
pected to reduce the need for diverting funds 
into unproductive use. However, due to sustain-
ability issues, IMFI cannot rely only on these 
charity funds. Thus, it is important for IMFI to 
explore other sources of fund. 
Like IMFI, IB is a value-oriented system 
which aims to achieve human centered eco-
nomic development (Asutay, 2010). Dusuki 
(2008) maintains with an impressive growth 
of IB over the last 30 years, IB is expected to 
emphasize on issues relating to social justice 
through financial inclusive program. In other 
words, IB is expected to provide financing to 
small and medium enterprise which are denied 
by formal financial institutions and actively 
participate in microfinance program to alleviate 
poverty, rather than overemphasize on profit-
ability. Further, Shahinpoor (2009) asserts that 
since the the provision of debt is crucial for the 
poor, Islamic bank have an important responsi-
bility on meeting financing needs of the poor. 
However, IB has been critisized for being un-
able to fulfil this objective. Rahman and Rahim 
(2007) argues that the concept of financing the 
poor by IB was not well developed, since many 
IBs do not provide an easy access to financing 
for the poor. In addition, most of IBs replace 
PLS (Profit and Loss Sharing) scheme with 
sales-based system.
Both IB and IMFIs aim to contribute in 
achieving social justice. Both emphasize ethi-
cal, moral, social, and religious factors to pro-
mote equality and encourage enterpreneurship 
and risk sharing (Obaidullah & Khan, 2008). 
However, due to they are different in nature, IB 
and IMFIs face different challenges in achiev-
ing this objectives. It is expected that synergy 
between IB and IMFI results in mutual bene-
fits. Some studies have proposed this synergy 
through careful investigation about the link 
between IB and IMFIs. For example, Ahmed 
(2004) argues that IB can complement the IM-
FIs initiatives to provide financial services to 
the poor. He further argues that due to IB’s large 
scale, IB can provide microfinance services to 
the poor without extra costs. Rahman (2007) 
argues that there is a nexus between IB and mi-
crofinance since many features of microfinance 
can be considered consistent with the broader 
goals of IB. Further, Dusuki (2008) argues that 
by practicing microfinance program, IB can 
extend their financing to meet different type of 
clients needs, and thus make positive contri-
butions to the fulfilment of the socioeconomic 
objectives of Islamic society,while maintaining 
the institutional viablility, competitiveness, and 
sustainability.
As an attempt to promote the synergy be-
tween IB and IMFIs, Bank Indonesia and The 
Ministry of Cooperatives & SME initiate the 
linkage program between IB and IMFI. This 
program is a strategy to utilize the players in 
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MSME sectors by involving the entire compo-
nents of financial industry (Abdullah, 2006). 
Generally, there are three models of linkage 
program; channelling, executing, and joint fi-
nancing. In chanelling model, BMT serves as 
middleman between IB and MSME. In execut-
ing model, IB provides financing to BMT to 
be disbursed to BMT clients. In joint financing 
model, IB and BMT together provide finance to 
MSME. 
Until 2009, there are 19 commercial banks 
signed up for linkage program. Among these 
banks, there are two IBs joint in linkage pro-
gram. These IBs include Bank Muamalat In-
donesia (partner with Islamic Rural Banks and 
BMTs) with linkage fund amounted of IDR 
66.586 billion and PT Bank Syariah Mandiri 
(partner with Rural Bank and Islamic Rural 
Bank) with with linkage fund amounted of IDR 
27 billion (Bank Indonesia, 2009). In addition, 
there are two Regional Development Banks 
(BPD) who signed up linkage program with Sh-
aria Rural Bank, Cooperative and BMT. These 
two Regional Development Banks are PT BPD 
Sumatera Utara with linkage fund amounted of 
IDR 3.28 billion and PT BPD Riau with link-
age fund amounted IDR 5.5 billion. Total credit 
ceiling for the linkage program with sharia/
rural banks during July 2008 – March 2009 is 
IDR 1.538 trilion while total credit ceiling for 
the linkage program with Cooperatives and 
BMT during July 2008 – March 2009 is IDR 
1.928 trilion (Bank Indonesia, 2009). This data 
shown that the credit ceiling of linkage fund to 
cooperative and BMT is higher compared to the 
sharia or rural banks.
Due to country-spesific case, empirical stud-
ies on the effectiveness of IB-BMT linkage 
program is limited. Maesaroh (2011) provide 
a case study about the effectiveness of link-
age program between Bank Syariah Mandiri 
with BMTs showing that linkage program in-
significantly affects the performance of BMT 
under observation. Kumara (2010) compares 
the performance of rural bank which joins the 
linkage program with those who does not join 
linkage program. This study shows that linkage 
program insignificantly affects the performance 
of rural bank which join the linkage program. 
Jubaedah (2009) investigates the linkage pro-
gram between Bank Muamalat Indonesia and 
Islamic Rural Banks showing that the executing 
model is more effective and significantly affect 
the performance of Islamic Rural Banks. 
The BMT’s internal factor that might affect 
the implementation of linkage program  includes 
low product diversification (Karim, Tarazi, & 
Reille, 2008; Saad, 2012), lack of reporting 
standard, lack of trainned personnel (Ahmed, 
2004; Rusydiana & Devi, 2013), and lack of 
managerial skills and inability to separate busi-
ness aspect from social aspect (Cokro & Ismail, 
2008). The external factor from BMT includes 
lack of regulation and supervisory (Rusydiana 
& Devi, 2013; Seibel, 2008), issues on profit 
sharing fairness between BMT and IB, compe-
tition among BMTs, competition between BMT 
and IB (Bambang, 2007), and unclear proce-
dure and standard on linkage program. 
IB internal factor that might affect the imple-
mentation of linkage program includes organi-
zation structure (Berger & Udell, 2002), lending 
technology (Owulah, 1990), level and of profit 
and monitoring cost (Huda, 2012; Shaban et al., 
2014). As in the BMT cases, IB external factors 
include regulation issues (Shaban et al., 2014), 
issues on profit sharing fairness between BMT 
and IB, competition among BMT, competition 
between BMT and IB, and unclear procedure 
and standard on linkage program.
Research Method
To answer the research questions, both quan-
titative and qualitative research methods are 
employed. Panel data regression model is em-
ployed to measure the effectiveness of linkage 
program on BMT while semi-structured inter-
views is conducted to identify the most pref-
erable linkage model and the key factors that 
affect effectiveness of linkage program. 
In panel data regression, there are 26 BMTs 
which are located in Java Island and Province 
of Lampung. Most BMT in Indonesia are locat-
ed in the Java Island. In addition, Province of 
Lampung is one of provinces outside the Java 
Island which have significant growth of BMT. In 
semi-structured interviews, purposive sampling 
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is employed as the interview method for inter-
viewing BMT and IB managers. In purposive 
sampling, researcher purposely chooses object 
who are relevant to the research topic (Saran-
takos, 1994). There are seven BMTs involved 
in the semi-structured interviews. Due to time 
constraint, all BMTs sample in this study are 
located in Jakarta. All BMTs sample in this re-
search has as legal status as sharia cooperatives 
which are under the supervision of The Minis-
try of Coopertives and SME. This legal status 
has allowed BMTs to raise fund from public 
(their members) and distribute the fund. BMT 
has to receive linkage fund from one or more 
IB to be eligible as research sample. All BMTs 
sample in this research is engaged in execut-
ing model of linkage program which is based 
on mudharabah contract. In this model, BMTs 
receive regular funding from IB, in which one 
BMTs also receive technical assistant. Some 
BMTs from this study receive fund from more 
than one IB. Further, the linkage fund is distrib-
uted by BMTs to their member, mainly in the 
form of murabahah contract. In addition, one 
IB manager is interviewed in order to comple-
ment the findings and point out IB key factors 
that affecting the linkage program. 
Panel Data Regression Model
This research focuses on two dimensions of 
the effectiveness of linkage program on BMT: 
BMT level of outreach and BMT sustainability. 
Panel data regression model is utilised to an-
swer the first research question. Gujarati (2012) 
explains that “panel data regression models is 
models that study the same group of entities 
(individuals, firms, states, and the like) over 
time”. There are three panel data models. The 
first model is Pooled Least Square (PLS) which 
requires that the slope coefficients are constant 
among subjects and the error term is uncorre-
lated with the regressors. The second model is 
Fixed Effects Model (FEM) which allows dif-
ferent intercept among individuals to reflect 
unique characteristics of individual units. The 
third model is Random Effect Model (REM) 
which assumes that the intercept value of an in-
dividual units is random drawing from a larger 
population with a global mean, in which an in-
dividual mean expressed as deviation from the 
global mean value. 
Panel data in this research is employed to 
analyze the pattern of annual financing growth 
and annual return on equity (ROE) of 26 BMTs 
during 2011 and 2013. The panel is balanced 
panel since the number of time observation is 
the same for each individual (Gujarati, 2012). 
The following basic panel regressions is esti-
mated for the period of 2011-2013.
BFGit = α+β1IBFGit+β2FGit+β3LnAssetsit+
  β4GDPPGit+β5CRit+(μi+εijt) (1)
ROEit = α+β6FERit+β7DARit+β8FARit+
  β9LnAssetsit+αi+(μi+εijt) (2)
Table 1 provides the description of each 
variable in panel regression model. Model (1) 
focuses on the effectiveness of IB-BMT link-
age program on BMT level of outreach. BMT 
financing growth (BFG) is used as proxy for 
level of outreach. BFG is measured based on 
Wagner and Winkler (2013) who identify the 
Table 1. Variable Description
Variable Measurement Expected Relation to Dependent Variable
Dependent Variables
BFG Log-difference of BMT’ total financing (after adjusted to Consumer Price Index 2010)
ROE Net Income/Total Equity
Independent Variables
IBFG Log-difference of IB total financing (after adjusted to Consumer Price Index 2010) Positive (+)
FG Log-difference of BMT total funding (after adjusted to Consumer Price Index 2010) Positive (+)
Ln Assets Natural Logarithm of Total Assets Positive (+)
GDPPG Growth of GDP per capita (after adjusted to Consumer Price Index 2010) Positive (+) 
CR Credit to MSME/GDP Indetermined
FER IB Financing/BMT Total Equity Indetermined
DAR BMT Total Deposits/BMT Total Asset of BMT Positive (+)
FAR BMT Financing/BMT Total Assets Positive (+)
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determinants of real credit growth of MFI in the 
global financial crisis period. At MFI level, the 
factors include MFI source of fund, MFI total 
risk, and MFIs size. MFI real credit growth is 
expected to be positively associated with MFI 
funding growth and negatively associated with 
total risks. At macroeconomic level, the factors 
include GDP growth (per capita), credit-to-
GDP ratio, and inflation. Both macroeconomic 
variables are expected to have a non-linear re-
lationship with real credit growth. 
Based on Wagner and Winkler’s (2013) 
work, panel regression is applied to test the 
impact of IB financing growth on BMT financ-
ing growth, by controlling factors at BMT level 
and macroeconomic variables. The dependent 
variable, BFG, is BMT annual real financing 
growth, a proxy for the level of outreach. The 
main explanatory variable of interest, IBFG, is 
the annual growth of total IB financing to BMT. 
BMT funding growth (FG) and BMT size (ln 
assets) are control variables from BMT level. 
BMT funding growth is annual growth of total 
saving and time deposits, a proxy for BMT abil-
ity to raise fund from sources other than IB. Ln 
assets is natural logarithm of BMT total assets, 
a proxy for BMT size. GDP growth (per capita) 
and SME credit-to-GDP ratio are macroeco-
nomic control variable. GDP growth (per capi-
ta) is proxy for the demand of microfinancing. 
SME credit-to-GDP ratio is proxy for the sup-
ply of microfinance by formal banking sectors.
Model (2) focuses on the effectiveness of 
linkage program on the BMT level of profit-
ability. This model follows Muriu (2011) who 
investigates the impact of financing choice on 
MFI profitability. In his study, Muriu (2011) 
identifies debt-to-equity ratio, deposits-to-
equity ratio, and loan-to-total assets ratio to 
be linked with MFI profitability. Except the 
debt-to-equity ratio which is indetermine, all 
variables are expected to have positive relation-
ship with MFI ROA. Based on Muriu’s work, 
panel regression is employed to test wheter IB 
financing has significant impact on BMT level 
of profitability. The dependent variable, ROE, 
is BMT return on equity, a proxy for BMT 
level of profit. The main explanatory variable, 
IB financing, is represented as percentage of 
financing-to-BMT-total equity ratio (FER). 
Other explanatory variables include deposits-
to-BMT-total assets ratio (DAR), financing-to-
BMT-total assets ratio (FAR), and ln assets as 
proxy of BMT size.
Qualitative Research Interview
Semi-structured interviews are conducted 
to complement panel regression analysis. This 
method is also used to answer the question 
about the most preferable linkage models and 
the key factors that affect the implementation 
of linkage program. The interviews involve 7 
BMT managers and 5 IB officers. Blumberg, 
Cooper, and Schindler (2011) explain that semi-
structured interviews are useful to understand a 
wide-range of problem that allows researcher to 
identify relevant issues to the problem. An im-
portant part of interview is thematizing an inter-
view which include the formulation of research 
question and a theoretical clarification of the 
theme investigated. The thematizing process in 
this research involves theoretical review on fac-
tors that might affect the implementation of IB-
BMT linkage program. According to Sekaran 
and Bougie (2009), interview data analysis con-
sists of three steps, which include data reduc-
tion, data display and data conclusion. In this 
study, the transcription of audio-recorded inter-
views is made first. Due to small size of sample, 
this study do not apply codification. Instead, the 
data is categorized and organised into table to 
present the analysis in simple way.   
Result 
Quantitative Analysis
Descriptive Statistic
The observation in this research includes 
26 BMT located in Java Island and Province 
of Lampung during period 2011-2013 with 78 
total observations. Table 2 presents the descrip-
tive statistics of the observation.
The average of BFG is 28.5% with standard 
deviation of 38.6%, while the average of ROE 
is 24.1% with standard deviation of 36.6%. 
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This financing growth and ROE are lower com-
pared to the growth of fund raised by BMT. The 
average of FG is 34.2% per year while the aver-
age of IBFG is 38.5%. However, this significant 
growth is followed by high standard deviation 
(68.2% for BFG and 78.3% for IBFG). This in-
dicates that although on average there is signifi-
cant growth on IBFG and BFG, these sources of 
fund is rather widely dispersed, suggesting that 
overall mean could be driven by a few BMT. 
From BMT financial ratio, the average of FER 
is 384.1%with standard deviation of 259.4%, 
suggesting that few BMT are highly leveraged. 
The average DAR is 0.51% with standard devi-
ation of 0.22%. The average FAR is 0.66% with 
standard deviation of 0.13%. From macroeco-
nomic variables, the average of GDP per capita 
growth is 4.6% per year while the average of 
SME-credit-to-GDP ratio is 2.1% with 3.4% 
and 0.09% standard deviation, respectively.
Classical Regression Assumption Test
As regression standard procedures, it is im-
portant to do classical regression assumption 
tests. However, since REM is employed using 
a Generalized Least Square Method (GLS), this 
step is not required. GLS technique is handled 
automatically by E-Views to ensure that there is 
no cross-correlations in the error terms (Brooks, 
2008).  Thus, test of autocorrelation and hetero-
scedasticity are not required.
Estimation Methods
This section reports the regression results us-
ing three panel data estimation methods; PLS, 
FEM, and REM; which have been discussed 
above. For each method, both model (1) and (2) 
are estimated.
Pooled Least Square Model
Table 3 reports regression results by using 
PLS. Panel 1 shows that all the explanatory 
variables are significant in explaining BMT 
financing growth. For model 2, FER, DAR, 
and Ln Assets are significant to explain BMT 
ROE while FAR are not significant. The prob-
lem with this method is this method does not 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
BFG ROE IBFG FG LnAssets GDPPG CR FER DAR FAR
Mean 0.285 0.241 0.385 0.342 22.896 0.046 0.021 3.841 0.515 0.665
Maximum 1.320 3.143 3.084 4.502 26.592 0.088 0.031 30.732 1.171 0.998
Minimum -1.418 0.000 -1.350 -2.062 19.764 0.004 0.009 0.067 0.083 0.256
Std. Dev 0.386 0.366 0.783 0.682 1.237 0.034 0.009 4.333 0.223 0.138
Table 3. Summary of Regression Results using PLS
Panel 1. Model 1 Estimation (PLS)
IBFG FG LNASSETS GDPPG CR R2
BFG 0.085*** 0.296*** -0.003** -2.342*** 15.797*** 0.416
(3.053) (3.753) (-1.950) (-2.406) (4.528)
Panel 2. Model 2 Estimation (PLS)
FER DAR FAR LNASSETS R2
ROE 0.049*** 0.351*** 0.054 -0.008*** 0.451
(6.252) (11.324) (0.094) (-2.903)
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. t-stat is in parentheses.
Table 4. Summary of Regression Results using FEM
Panel 3. Model 1 Estimation (FEM)
Alpha IBFG FG LNASSETS GDPPG CR R2 F-Stat
BFG -6.808** 0.039*** 0.183*** 0.294*** 1.650*** 8.734*** 0.822 7.264***
(-6.554) (8.076) (9.564) (6.555) (4.198) (20.864)
Panel 4. Model 2 Estimation (FEM)
Alpha FER DAR FAR LNASSETS R2 F-Stat
ROE 1.094*** 0.051*** 0.019 0.181*** -0.051*** 0.893 13.904***
(4.998) (14.510) (0.338) (10.229) (-6.808)
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. t-stat is in parentheses.
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allow differences in average financing growth 
at BMT level and thus cannot capture the BMT 
specific effect (Brooks, 2008).
Fixed Effects Model
Unlike PLS, FEM allows different intercept 
for each BMT to capture BMT-specific effects. 
Table 4 reports regression results using FEM. 
For model 1, all the explanatory variables are 
significant. For model 2, all the explanatory 
variables, except DAR, are significant to ex-
plain BMT ROE.
To determine whether PLS or FEM is more 
appropriate or not, the Chow-test is conducted 
(Brooks, 2008; Gujarati, 2012) as shown in Ta-
ble 5.
Ho : Pooled Least Square Methods
H1 : Fixed Effects Methods
Based on Table 5, since the probability of 
Chi-square for both model is less than 0.05 in-
dicating that null hypothesis is rejected for both 
equation. Thus, FEM is more appropriate then 
the PLS.
Random Effects Methods 
As in FEM, the REM allows different inter-
cept for each entity and this intercept is con-
stants across the time. The difference, however, 
REM assumes that the intercept for each entity 
arise from a common intercept α plus a random 
variable εi. Table 6 reports the regression result 
using REM. As Panel 5 indicated, except BMT 
size, all the explanaory variables are signifi-
cant (with α = 1%) to explain BMT financing 
growth. For model 2, all the explanatory vari-
ables are significant (with α = 1%) to explain 
BMT ROE.
To determine whether FEM or REM is more 
appropriate or not, the Hausman-test is con-
ducted (Brooks, 2008; Gujarati, 2012) as shown 
in Table 7.
Ho : Random Effects Methods
H1 : Fixed Effects Methods
Based on Table 7, the probability of Chi-
square for both models is less than 0.05. The 
null hypothesis for both models are rejected, 
which indicate that REM is more appropriate 
Table 5. Summary of Chow-test
Chow Test Model (1)
Chi-Square 3.176
Prob 0.000
Chow Test (Model 2)
Chi-Square 67.012
Prob 0.000
Table 6. Summary of Regression Results using REM
Panel 5. Model 1 Estimation (REM)
Alpha IBFG FG LNASSETS GDPPG CR R2 F-Stat
BFG 0.277 0.084*** 0.294*** -0.015 -2.110*** 14.485*** 0.417 10.316***
(0.465) (2.650) (3.676) (-0.600) (-2.189) (6.252)
Panel 6. Model 2 Estimation (REM)
Alpha FER DAR FAR LNASSETS R2 F-Stat
ROE 0.720*** 0.070*** 0.386*** 0.307*** -0.050** 0.641 32.611***
(5.596) (4.382) (3.311) (3.360) (-7.416)
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. t-stat is in parentheses.
Table 7. Summary of Hausmann-test
Hausman Test Model (1)
Chi-Square 0.000
Prob 1.000
Hausman Test Model (2)
Chi-Square 0.000
Prob 1.000
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than FEM. There are two additional explana-
tions why REM is more appropriate. First, al-
though FEM allows for entity-specific effects, 
this model requires that the number of periods 
should be equal or more than the number of 
observations (T≥N). The data in this research, 
however, is short panel where the number 
of cross-section or individual units N (26) is 
greater than the number of time periods, T (3). 
Second, it is not the interest of this research to 
investigate BMT specific-effects.
Analysis of Regression Results
Linkage Program and BMT Level of Outreach
Results on Panel 5 on Table 6 show that IB 
financing growth to BMT through linkage pro-
gram is associated with BMT financing growth, 
and thus, increases the level of outreach. IB 
financing growth is statistically significant 
(α=1%) with positive sign. As indicated by the 
coefficient, BMT financing growth increases 
by 0.084% with 1% increase in IB financing 
growth. Wagner and Winkler (2013) argue that 
MFI credit growth rises with the ability of MFI 
to rise funding from external sources. Coleman 
(2007) studies the impact of leverage on MFI 
and argues that, although it is not significant, 
MFIs with long-term debt (financing) shows 
positive relationship with level of outreach. 
This finding, however, is inconsistent with 
Hoque, Chishty, and Halloway (2011) who ar-
gue that leverage decrease the level of outreach 
to the very poor because of increase in cost of 
capital leads to higher cost of borrowing, higher 
default rate and increase risk. In the case of Is-
lamic Microfinance (IMFI), this problem might 
not arise since most IMFI use ZIS fund to serve 
the very poor segment. The same case with 
BMT, they provide qardul-hassan loan from 
ZIS fund to serve the very poor segment and to 
make them feasible to receive regular financ-
ing. IB financing is disbursed as productive fi-
nancing only for the micro segments. 
Notwithstanding IB financing has a sig-
nificant impact on BMT financing growth, the 
economic significance is rather small. There 
are three possible explanations. First, although 
linkage program is designed to promote syn-
ergy between IB and BMT, the real fact indi-
cates that there is competition between IB and 
BMT in enhancing their market share (Bam-
bang, 2007). In addition, based on Bank Indo-
nesia statistic, there is an increase on IB office 
branch from 1.763 in 2010 to 2.669 in 2013. 
This data implies that IB focuses on improving 
their infrastructure and networking by increas-
ing their branch office 53% which enable them 
to serve the poor directly (Sholahuddin, 2013). 
Second, full support from the government on 
linkage program has not been received, par-
ticularly for BMT. Although the government 
provides guarantee for BMT, most of them still 
find difficulties to access financing from bank 
due to the collateral requirement. In addition, 
Islamic Cooperative performance appraisal set 
by the Ministry of Cooperatives is less valid 
from the IB point of view (Oktarianisa, 2011). 
Third, as shown by descriptive statistics that 
the high standard deviation on IB financing is 
rather widely dispersed, suggesting that over-
all mean could be driven by a few BMT, prob-
ably large BMT. This implies that IB financing 
might be concentrated only on few large BMT 
with minimum risks. 
BMT funding growth is highly positively as-
sociated with BMT financing growth. The coef-
ficient indicated that an increase of 1% in BMT 
funding growth will increase BMT financing 
growth by 0.29%. Tchuigoua (2014) maintains 
that deposit is one of resources used by MFI to 
provide loan. For some MFI, deposits also rein-
force the credit contract and serve as collateral. 
All BMT in this sample are deposits-taken in-
stitutions. They require deposits (minimum for 
3 month) as a prerequisite to provide financing. 
This result implies that deposit is still the main 
sources of funds for BMT to extend financing 
for their clients. 
Both GDP growth and SME credit-to-GDP 
growth are highly significant in explaining BMT 
financing growth. The negative sign on GDP 
growth suggests that BMT financing growth 
will decrease about 2.11% with GDP growth 
rising by 1%. This finding is inconsistent with 
Tchuigoua (2014) and Ahlin et al. (2011) and 
other robust arguments on positive relationship 
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between credit supply-demand and economic 
growth. However, possible explanation is giv-
en by Wagner and Winkler (2013) who argue 
that growing economy is associated with a de-
cline in the number of informal business sector, 
the main client group of MFI. Kiss, Nagy, and 
Vonnack (2006) argue that, at firm level, an in-
crease in GDP is associated with increasing in 
productivity through higher profits and make it 
possible for firms to rely more on internal fund. 
At household level, households might want to 
decrease loan to smooth consumption at time 
when their income is temporarily exceed the 
expected levels.
The positive coefficient on SME credit-to-
GDP ratio suggests that BMT funding growth 
increase by about 14.48% with credit-to-GDP 
ratio increase by 1%. Wagner and Winkler 
(2013) maintain that the impact of credit-to-
GDP ratio might be non-linear. At one side, if 
MFIs and formal banks substitute one another, 
the increase in credit-to-GDP ratio is expected 
to decrease the MFIs credit growth since more 
people will have easier financial access to for-
mal banking. On the contrary, if MFIs and bank-
ing sector complement each other, an increase 
in credit-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase 
MFIs credit growth as this will enable MFI to 
access commercial loans and extend this loan 
to their clients (Tchuigoua, 2014). Similarly, 
Ahlin et al. (2011) suggest that formal finan-
cial sector might complements MFIs by provid-
ing incentives to maintain good credit histories 
and by allowing enterprise to advance beyond 
microcredit. At this point, enterprise with good 
credit history which initially is MFI client has 
an opportunity to access financing from formal 
financial sector. The regression results support 
the second argument, in which BMT and the 
whole banking sectors complement each other. 
However, an interesting point should be made 
when this result is linked toprevious result sug-
gesting that IB financing growth has a rela-
tively low impact on BMT financing growth. 
As banking sector in Indonesia consists of both 
conventional and Islamic bank, a highly signifi-
cant coefficient of credit-to-GDP ratio might 
indicate that there is a possibility commercial 
loan from conventional bank is one of determi-
nants of BMT financing growth. 
Linkage Program and BMT Level of Profit
Results on Panel 6 on Table 6 show that IB 
financing growth as percentage of BMT equity 
(FER) has significant impact on BMT ROE. 
The coefficient sign is positive (α = 1%) in-
dicates that a 1% increase in IB financing-to-
BMT-total equity ratio will increase BMT ROE 
by 0.07%. This result is consistent with study 
by Muriu (2011) who finds that debt-to-equity 
ratio has positive impact on profitability. He 
further explains that if MFI could finance their 
operation using long-term debt with higher 
margin than the cost of the debt, the sharehold-
ers would benefit as more earnings are being 
spread among the same number of shareholders. 
Similarly, Coleman (2007) argues that higher 
leverage will result higher level of outreach and 
higher premium. This premium then becomes 
MFI source of income and profitability. 
Result shows that BMT can earn higher mar-
gin than cost of fund from IB, which in turn 
increase BMT’s ROE. The use of leverage can 
reduce the agency problem between outside 
equity holders and manager. Higher leverage 
raises efficiency since this will increase man-
ager motivation to maximize the shareholders 
value (Berger and Di Patti, 2006). In BMT case, 
this theory might be translated that higher IB 
financing will increase BMT manager motiva-
tion to raise efficiency, thus raise the profitabil-
ity, to ensure BMT is able to make installments 
to IB. 
The economic significance of IB financing 
to ROE is relatively small. This might be ex-
plained by the asymmetric information between 
IB and BMT. In this case, BMTs are the holder 
of information. Binks et al. (cited in Berggren, 
Olofsson, & Silver, 2000) argue that the une-
ven distribution between IB and BMT results 
in increase on informational cost that may re-
duce the profitability. In addition, based on in-
terview result, one of interviewee indicates that 
although linkage program has allowed BMT 
to earn margin, the margin is relatively small 
and as the result it is difficult for BMT to accu-
mulate capital from this spread. Another BMT 
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manager states that linkage program does not 
help BMT to be self-sufficient due to the short 
term financing period. In the case of BMT with 
small assets, it is difficult to maximize the fund 
turnover in order to maximize the return. An-
other possible explanation is related to financ-
ing risk. In executing model, BMT bears all the 
financing risk. When the default rate is high, 
this factor may limit BMT ability to earn high 
profit since the profit from linkage fund might 
be offset by BMT expense to cover the financ-
ing default. 
Among control variable, deposits-to-BMT-
total assets ratio is highly associated with in-
crease in ROE in positive sign. An increase 1% 
in DAR ratio will increase BMT ROE by 0.38%. 
This result also consistent with Muriu (2011) 
who argues that large share of deposits-to-as-
sets appears to boost MFI profitability since 
large deposit will lower overall MFI cost of 
fund. BMT financing-to-BMT-total assets ratio 
positively associated with ROE. The coefficient 
of FAR suggests that an increase 1% in FAR 
ratio will increase BMT ROE by 0.30%. This 
result is inconsistent with Muriu (2011) who 
finds negative relationship between FAR and 
profitability. However, he explains that MFIs 
specializes in lending which enables MFIs to 
earn more interest revenue due to higher risk 
and thus has a positive impact on ROE.  The 
coefficient of negative ln assets might indicate 
that larger BMT tend to be less efficient (Berger 
& Di Patti, 2006).
Qualitative Analysis
This section reports semi-structured inter-
views report. Interviews are conducted to an-
swer the second and the third research question 
regarding the factors that affect linkage pro-
gram and the best linkage model. 
Motivation, Awareness, and Effectiveness of 
Linkage Program
Most BMT join the linkage program due to 
the needs for additional fund. However, this 
factor is not the only motivation to join linkage 
program. Another factor includes the need to 
build synergy with other Islamic Financial In-
stitutions and the need to maintain liquidity. On 
IB side, enlarging the market penetration is the 
only motivation to provide financing for BMT. 
Most BMT managers are aware with executing 
and channeling linkage model, however, they 
are not aware with joint financing linkage mod-
el since this model has not been applied widely. 
In terms of the effectiveness of linkage 
program, most interviewees state that linkage 
program helps BMT to increase the number of 
BMT clients and help BMT to be self-sustained. 
BMTs in the sample use linkage fund to expand 
their financing. One interviewee states that the 
demand for BMT financing from local commu-
nity is increasing so that BMT need external fi-
nancing to meet this demand. In addition, link-
age fund is also helping one BMT to increase 
its reputation due to its increase in liquidity to 
service fund withdrawal from its member as 
well as to provide financing. Although margin 
earned form this linkage fund is relatively small, 
but if the number of BMT clients increase, the 
margin will be significant. However, one in-
terviewee states that linkage program does not 
help BMT to be self-sustained in the short-term 
financing. In the short-term period, BMTs are 
still unable to earn sufficient incomes which en-
force BMTs to make the installment by using 
the financing principal. The overall results con-
firm the panel regression results which suggest 
that linkage program increase BMT level of 
outreach and profitability. From IB side, three 
of five respondents state that linkage program 
help Islamic Bank to fulfill the social objective 
to finance the poor.
Preferred Linkage Model
Among three linkage models, executing 
model appears to be most effective model, both 
for IB and BMT. Since joint financing model 
has not been applied there are only two linkage 
models; executing and channeling model. Cur-
rently, most BMT and IB use and prefer execut-
ing linkage model. Channeling model is used to 
finance clients with large amount of financing 
that is beyond BMT ability. 
BMT prefer to use executing model since 
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this model has high flexibility in terms of the 
disbursement of linkage fund. BMT manage, 
distribute, monitor, and collect the repayment 
of linkage fund directly to their clients. Higher 
risk in executing model is followed by higher 
margin, about 2% - 3%. On the comparison, 
in channeling model, since IBs fully bear the 
risk, BMTs only earn small fee (about 0.25%) 
for serving as middlemen between IB and cli-
ents. In addition, executing model enable BMT 
to minimize the risk of losing their clients. In 
channeling model, BMTs serve as middleman 
between IB and clients, in which IB can access 
information about the clients. Unlike executing 
model, in channeling model IB interact with the 
clients and conduct direct survey before provid-
ing financing. Since channeling clients are per-
ceived as potential clients, there is a risk that IB 
will take over these clients by providing direct 
financing to them and reduce BMTs’ market 
share. 
IB prefers executing model for three reasons. 
First, compare to channelling model, the analy-
sis process in executing model is more straight 
forward since the object of the analysis is BMT 
instead of end users. Second, IB reduce the risk 
of financing since BMT bears all the risk. This 
guarantees IB to receive a full payment of the 
principal plus the profit-sharing from the fi-
nancing. On the contrary, in channelling model, 
IB bear all the financing risk. The monitoring 
process in executing model is also easier as IB 
only needs to monitor BMT. Finally, since IBs 
have various financing segments, delegating the 
monitoring process to BMT in executing model 
allows IB to focus on these various financing 
segments. The comparison between executing 
and channelling model is presented on Table 8.
Key Factors on the Effectiveness of Linkage 
Program
BMT Key Factors on the Effectiveness of 
Linkage Program
Results from interviews findings sug-
gest that among BMT internal factors, lack of 
trained personnel, and lack of managerial skill 
are the key factors that affect the effectiveness 
of linkage program. The external factors seem 
to have more impact on effectiveness of linkage 
program. These include lack of regulation and 
supervision, fairness issue on PLS, and compe-
tition between BMT and IB.
Two of seven BMT interviewees state that 
lack of trained personel affects the effective-
ness of linkage program. For example, although 
training is less needed for financing officers to 
Table 8. Comparison between Linkage Models
Comparison Between Linkage Model (BMT)
Executing Channeling 
Advantages: Advantages:
1. High level of flexibility 1. Larger Financing Size
2. Minimize the risk of losing customer 2. No financing risk
3. Higher spread between cost of fund and cost of financing
4. Convenience
Disadvantages: Disadvantages:
1. Financing risk 1. Risk on losing customer
2. Collateral requirement 2. Rigid procedure and requirement
3. Additional monitoring costs
4. Less-Sharia compliant
Comparison Between Linkage Model (IB)
Executing Channeling 
Advantages: Advantages:
1. IB delegate financing to BMT 1. High level of security
2. BMT can develop financing concept 2. Rigid feasibility analysis
3. Easier feasibility analysis process
Disadvantages: Disadvantages:
1. Difficult to monitor 1. Takes longer time in feasibility analysis
2. Takes more effort to monitor BMT one by one
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collect the payments, training is highly impor-
tant for marketing staffs who sell the products 
since these marketing staffs bring new prod-
ucts (Sharia compliant products). The other 
interviewees also indicate that there is lack of 
training for BMT staffs. However, this lack of 
training might not affect the effectiveness of the 
linkage program since most of their staffs are 
familiar with the process and the system. 
In the case of lack of managerial skills, three 
of seven interviewees state that lack of mangeri-
al skills affects the effectiveness program. This 
managerial skill usually related to lack of busi-
ness focus and individual characters. For exam-
ple, there is a case where due to lack of busi-
ness focus, BMT managers provide financing 
to a capital-intensive project, such as property 
project, which is not suitable for BMT. There is 
also a case when due to manager’s carelessness, 
the BMT have difficulties to access new financ-
ing from banks. 
Lack of product diversification does not af-
fect the effectiveness of linkage program. Al-
though there are various types of sharia con-
tract, most BMT use murabahah, ijarah, and 
mudharabah as their underlying contract for 
their products where largest financing propor-
tion is dominated by murabahah contract. The 
linkage fund will be distributed in the form of 
these three contracts. It is not the type of un-
derlying contract that affect the effectiveness of 
linkage program. The effectiveness of linkage 
program depend on the ability of BMTs’ mar-
keting staff to sell existing product and distrib-
ute the linkage fund through these product. In 
addition, two interviewees state that BMT have 
higher product diversification compared to IB 
and this variety of products become one of the 
reason why IBs are interested doing linkage 
program with BMT. 
Lack of reporting standard became chal-
lenge for BMT only at the beginning of linkage 
program.  Some IB partners are also involved in 
giving assistance and training on reporting. All 
interviewees state that combining both busi-
ness and social aspects does not affect the ef-
fectiveness of linkage program. Two interview-
ees state that both business and social aspects 
are synergy. There is a case of one BMT in the 
sample which utilize synergy between social 
and business aspect of BMT. At the begining 
this BMT provide financing to extremely poor 
clients in the form of charity (using zakat, in-
faq, and shadaqah fund) which is part of BMTs 
social function. At the first step, BMT pro-
vide the fund for free. After the recepient run 
the business and find the best pattern on their 
business, BMT then strengthen this by giving 
qardul-hassan loan. At the first step, there is no 
administration process. However, in the second 
step there is adminstration process. The clients 
need to sign a contract and they must pay the 
loan principal. The qardul-hassan loan is pro-
vided maximal twice. If these clients shows 
significant increase in cash inflow, then they 
can access regular financing from BMT that en-
able BMT to earn margin. Another interviewee 
states that when the business aspect of BMT 
is stagnant, social aspect can complement this 
stagnation by providing development or em-
powerment programs using social fund. 
Among BMT external factors, lack of regu-
lation and supervision, fairness issue on PLS 
and competition between BMT and IB affect 
the effectiveness of linkage program. The Min-
istry of Cooperatives & SME provides training 
to BMT about the new regulation and provides 
BMT performance appraisal and rating BMT. 
The Ministry of Cooperative & SME also re-
quires BMT to submit their financial report reg-
ularly. However, this monitoring is less strict 
compared to IB standard and without sufficient 
feedback. 
Two interviewees state that the profit sharing 
between BMT and IB is not fair enough. One 
interviewee states that the profit-sharing for IB 
is higher compared to conventional bank. The 
spread BMT earned is small because IB financ-
ing is more expensive compared to deposits 
fund received from BMT member. As the re-
sult, it is difficult to accumulate capital from the 
margin with current profit sharing. For exam-
ple, one BMT charge 2-2.5% higher than cost 
of fund on its clients. Another BMT earn 2% 
margin in which 0.5% of this margin is paid for 
account officer fee. The rest interviewees state 
that the profit sharing between BMT and IB in 
linkage program is fair enough. Current profit 
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sharing scheme still allow BMT to maximize 
their financing. In addition, the flexibility in us-
ing the linkage fund also benefits the BMT. 
Regarding competition between BMT and 
IB, most interviewees state that this does not 
affect the effectiveness of the linkage program. 
However, they state that most BMTs concern 
about this issue. For example, most BMT avoid 
using channelling model since this scheme re-
quires BMT to provide comprehensive data 
about the clients. An interesting insight is there 
are some cases when IBs try to offer financing 
to BMT clients directly but the clients are un-
comfortable with IB procedure and decide to 
borrow from BMT although with higher mar-
gin. All interviewees state that competition 
between BMT does not affet the effectiveness 
of linkage program. In addition, they also state 
that linkage program procedure is clear. 
Among other factor from BMT point of view 
includes the risk-sharing. The underlying con-
tract in executing model commonly is mudhar-
abah. However, current practice is that BMT 
fully bear the default risk should clients fail 
to make the repayment. BMT are responsible 
to make regular payment and the principal of 
linkage fund. This practice raise two important 
issues. First, from Sharia perspective, it is not 
permissible. Under mudharabah contract, in the 
absence of BMT neglience, IB as rab ul maal 
should bear the risk if clients fail to make re-
payment. Second, from economic perspectives, 
this practice limits BMT income-accumulation 
process since the income is used to cover the 
default financing. 
IB Key Factor on the Effectiveness of Linkage 
Program
Banking regulation is the only relevant key 
factor that may impact the effectiveness of link-
age program. For example, the capital require-
ment from central bank will affect the loanable 
fund available. This will affect the allocation or 
proportion of IB financing to BMT. However, 
interview’s results indicate that IB still has low 
level of confidence on BMT. IB concerns on 
BMT legal status, BMT ability to analyze and 
monitor the financing, and the gap between IB 
and BMT. Regarding the legal status, IB prefer 
to finance BMT who have legal status as Islamic 
Cooperatives. In addition, since Islamic Coop-
eratives are under the Ministry of Cooperatives, 
it is expected that the regulation and the moni-
toring on BMT to be more stringent since this 
will make IB work  in analyzing BMT easier 
before giving the financing. IB also concern on 
the quality of BMT in analysing and monitoring 
their clients who will be financed. The gap be-
tween IB and BMT also affect the effectiveness 
of linkage program.
Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to investigate the 
impact of the synergy between IB and BMT 
through linkage program on BMT levels of out-
reach and profitability. This paper also aims to 
investigate the most preferable linkage model 
and key factors on the effectiveness of link-
age program. Using panel data regression and 
semi structured interview, results reveal that IB 
financing has positively associated with BMT 
financing growth and BMT ROE. This implies 
that IB financing enable BMT to increase the 
level of outreach and the level of profitability. 
Currently, among three linkage models, ex-
ecuting model appears to be the most effective 
model. Both IB and BMT have their internal and 
external factors which affect implementation of 
linkage program. BMT’s  internal key factors 
that affect the effectiveness of linkage program 
include BMT managerial skill and the quality 
of human resources, while the BMT’s external 
factor include the regulation and supervision, 
the PLS scheme between IB and BMT, and the 
competition between BMT and IB. Meanwhile, 
IB’s internal key factors on the effectiveness 
of linkage program are banking regulation and 
low level of IB confidence on BMT ability. 
This paper argues that although the econom-
ic significance of IB financing to BMT is still 
small, the synergy between IB and BMT ben-
efits both parties and also can help in realizing 
Sharia objective to provide access to finance 
for the poor. The argument above is based on 
mutual benefits from IB-BMT linkage program. 
From BMT side, the benefits from joint link-
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age program include an increase on the level 
of outreach and profitability. In addition, link-
age program also allows transfer of knowledge 
from IB to BMT. From IB sides, linkage pro-
gram allows IB to meet their social obligation 
and at the same time to minimize the risk from 
financing the poor. Most importantly, from eco-
nomic point of view, linkage program is an in-
come-generating activity that allows IB to earn 
profit and enlarge the financing diversification. 
In addition, BMT deposits their clients’ saving 
fund on IB. These funds have low cost of fund 
which can be used by IB to extend short-term 
financing and generate income. 
The results of this study have several impli-
cations. Firstly, at BMT level, it is important 
for BMT to balance both social and business 
aspects. Results indicate that some BMTs have 
left their social mission behind. They only dis-
burse institutional zakah or infaq instead of act-
ing as amil. This shifting on mission is incon-
sistent with the responsibility of BMT as IMFI. 
Based on hadith about how Prophet SAW 
(peace be upon him) respond to a man of An-
sar who begged for him, Obaidullah and Khan 
(2008) describe the fundamental conditions of 
a successful microfinance program. This fun-
damental condition includes access and assess 
the poorest, transformation of unproductive 
assets with involvement of larger community 
in the process, meeting the basic needs, direct 
involvement in capacity building, technical as-
sistance, transparent accounting, and liberty to 
use part of income to meet higher needs. In this 
case, BMT can use ZIS (Zakah Infaq Shadaqah) 
fund to identify the poorest segment of the soci-
ety and meet their basic needs. Thus, ZIS fund 
should be disbursed in the form of zakat, infaq, 
or shadaqah for consumption needs. In the sec-
ond step, in order to transform unproductive as-
sets, BMT can use ZIS fund to provide qardul 
hassan to enable the poorest to start new busi-
ness. To support the new business, it is impor-
tant that BMT monitor and assist the business 
through direct involvement. In the third step, 
when the business can generate income consist-
ently, BMT can provide regular financing us-
ing linkage fund by utilising executing model. 
Finally, as the business grow larger and need 
larger amount of financing, BMT can use chan-
nelling model to link the same client to IB.
Secondly, BMT should be careful in deter-
mining the margin rate charged to their clients. 
High cost of fund charged by IB can lead BMT 
to increase margin rate on final clients in or-
der to earn profit. Although profitability is an 
important factor on sustainability, charging un-
reasonable margin will decrease the demand on 
BMT financing since demand for microfinance 
service is not inelastic. Unjustified high mar-
gin is inconsistent with the noble objectives of 
BMT to empower Muslim community. Moreo-
ver, high margin lowers the rate of repayment 
and thus lowers the profitability (Cull, Kunt, 
and Morduch, 2007). Instead of charging higher 
margin to their clients, it is preferable that BMT 
focuses on how to increase their efficiency so 
that they can maximize the spread between cost 
of fund and operating cost. 
At the IB level, there are three implications. 
First and the most important implication is re-
lated to Sharia issue. As discussed previously, 
most BMTs use executing model with mudhar-
abah as the underlying contract. It is expected 
that IB bear the financing risk instead of re-
quiring regular fixed payment and principal to 
be guaranteed by BMT. In order to minimize 
the risk, IB can initiate to apply joint financ-
ing model that allow IB share the financing risk 
with BMT. Second, since the PLS rate between 
IB and BMT depends on IB cost of fund, IB 
should carefully identify and allocate funding 
from third party with the lowest cost of fund. 
This allows IB to charge lower cost of financ-
ing to BMT. It is expected that BMT is still 
profitable without charging high margin to their 
clients. Third, since most IB is less confidence 
with BMT ability to analyse and monitor the 
financing, transfer of knowledge may benefit 
both institutions. It is expected that transfer of 
knowledge will narrow down the gap between 
IB and BMT. 
Fourth, at regulator level, linkage program 
requires better coordination between Bank In-
donesia and The Ministry of Cooperatives & 
SME. However, there is a gap in regulation 
and supervision. The general framework is that 
Bank Indonesia support the program by setting 
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regulation that allows IMFI to get access to fi-
nancial services while The Ministry of Cooper-
ative & SME supporst this program by provid-
ing technical assitance to IMFIs to help them 
become feasible to access financing from bank. 
On the IB side, there is well-established bank-
ing regulation to facilitate the implementation 
of linkage program. To promote financial inclu-
sion program in Indonesia, Bank Indonesia has 
stipulated Bank Indonesia Regulation (Num-
ber 14/22/PBI/2012) concerning on Loan and 
Financing Channelling by Commercial Bank 
and Technical Assistance in Developing Micro, 
Small, and Medium Enterprise. This regulation 
has mandated banking sector to have minimum 
of 20% MSME  as their target market. Bank In-
donesia also gives technical assistance to banks 
to prepare their human resources in providing 
financing to MSME. As an incentives, Bank In-
donesia publishes banks ratings based on their 
credit portion on MSME. On the other hand, 
The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME has not 
played significant role in assisting BMT to be-
come feasible for financing access. In order to 
have access on IB financing, BMT must have 
legal status as cooperative. However, this legal 
status is not sufficient. The regulation and su-
pervision on BMT is not as strict as on banking 
regulation which increase the uncertainty for IB 
to provide financing to BMT. 
Although Bank Indonesia has shown sig-
nificant role in promoting and facilitating the 
linkage program, however, some banking regu-
lations such as collateral, cash collateral, and 
business permit certificate requirements have 
hindered BMT to join the linkage program. 
Further consideration about this requirement 
for IMFI should be taken in order to increase 
the number of BMT in the linkage program. 
The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME has many 
tasks to be accomplished. The most important 
task is to make the regulation on BMT more 
stringent since this will help IB to do the analy-
sis on BMT performance. There should be reg-
ular monitoring on BMT and proper feedback 
from this monitoring should be provided. Gar-
maise and Natividad (cited in Ghosh and Tassel, 
2011) argue that when MFI receive favourable 
external ratings, there is a significant reduction 
in their cost of financing. Although The Minis-
try of Cooperatives & SME provide the regular 
training for BMT, the quality and quantity of 
the trainings should be improved and cover the 
BMT demands. 
To conclude, both the IB and BMT have 
their own role in Islamic financial system. Ide-
ally, as IB represents the largest proportion in 
Islamic financial system, IB should contribute 
more to achieve social objectives. However, it 
is unlikely that one institution does all the jobs. 
Due to their responsibility as mudharib, IB is 
responsible to manage their clients’ fund to the 
best of their interest. In addition, the level of 
public understanding and acceptance on PLS 
scheme is still low. Mismanagement by IB in 
allocating their third party fund will decrease 
the level of public confidence on IB. However, 
IB still can fulfil its social objectives through 
two-steps financing. BMTs have competitive 
advantage on dealing with MSME clients that 
is difficult to be replicated by IB. Their close re-
lationship with their clients and their flexibility 
in funding and financing become their most im-
portant competitive advantage. However, BMT 
scale is relatively small. They need additional 
fund to increase the scale of financing. The syn-
ergy between IB and BMT, if conducted prop-
erly and fairly, will help these institutions meet 
their social objectives. 
Due to time and data constrain, this study 
has some limitation. First, the financial data is 
only consists of 26 BMTs within short periode. 
In addition, this financial data also limited to 
major items in BMTs’ balance sheet and in-
come statement without further detail descrip-
tion. Second, the sample in the interview is lim-
ited only in Jakarta which are considered less 
representative to describe the BMT population 
which mostly located in West Java, Central 
Java, and East java. An improvement can be 
made in further study by providing wide range 
of BMT’s financial data. In addtion, to measure 
the level of outreach, it is important to have the 
exact number of BMT’s clients before and after 
joining linkage program. The large number of 
both BMT and IB interview sample will also 
enhance the findings of further research.
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